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Neutrality in the business sphere: an encroachment on rights 
protection and state sovereignty? 
Jessica Giles* 
  
‘In [the Achbita and Boungnaoui cases], the Court is expected to give a landmark decision the 
impact of which could extend beyond the specific context of the main proceedings and be ground 
breaking in the world of work throughout the European Union, at least so far as the private sector 
is concerned.’  
This was the prediction of Advocate General Kokott in her opinion for the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Achbita and another v G4S Secure Solutions NV (Case C-157/15) 31 
May 2016, paragraph 6, referring also to Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion in the parallel 
case of Bougnaoui and another v Micropole SA (Case C-188/15) 13 July 20161. Weiler describes 
the case as giving rise to ‘hugely difficult conceptual issues’.2  
This case comment will explore the impact of these decisions, which are indeed likely to be ground 
breaking in the world of work throughout the European Union but in a way that could potentially 
be damaging to the cohesive fabric of the Union and its external policy.  
The CJEU gave its rulings on 14 March 2017 establishing that in certain circumstances the freedom 
to conduct a business pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union may take precedence over religion as a protected characteristic, pursuant to Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
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see my case comment Giles, J. ‘A hoped for coherent and permissive EU religious freedom policy: the Bougnaoui 
and Achbita cases’ [2017] PILARS CC 1: http://law-school.open.ac.uk/sites/law-
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in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p 16) ‘the Anti-discrimination Directive’. The 
cases were two independent references, one from Belgium (Achbita) and the other from France 
(Bougnaoui), providing the CJEU with the opportunity to examine religion as a protected 
characteristic under the operation of the Anti-Discrimination Directive. They sit against a 
background that Advocate General Kokott describes in her opinion at paragraph 2 as:  
‘The legal issues surrounding the Islamic headscarf are symbolic of the more fundamental question 
of how much difference and diversity an open and pluralistic European society must tolerate within 
its borders and, conversely, how much assimilation it is permitted to require from certain 
minorities.’  
Both cases concerned Muslim women employed in the private sector. Ms Samira Achbita, a 
Muslim throughout her contract of employment, was employed in Belgium by G4S Secure 
Solutions NV (G4S), a company providing, inter alia, security and reception services to customers 
from the public and private sectors. G4S had a policy, applicable at the commencement of Ms 
Achbita’s contract as an unwritten company rule and later incorporated into the employee code, 
that:  
‘Employees are prohibited, in the workplace, from wearing any visible signs of their political, 
philosophical or religious beliefs and/or from giving expression to any ritual arising from them’.  
When she was dismissed for refusing to refrain from wearing her headscarf, Mrs Achbita brought 
a claim for wrongful dismissal seeking alternatively damages for infringement of the law to combat 
discrimination. Both the court of first instance and the appeal court dismissed her claim on the 
basis that there was no indirect or direct discrimination and her dismissal could not be regarded as 
manifestly unreasonable or discriminatory since G4S was not under an obligation to assume that 
its ban was illegal. On an appeal in cassation the Court of Cassation, Belgium, referred the 
following question to the CJEU:  
‘Should article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on 
wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf at the workplace does not constitute direct discrimination 
where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees from wearing outward signs of political, 
philosophical and religious beliefs at the workplace’.  
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Article 2 of the Directive reads:  
‘Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred 
to in Article 1;  
Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular 
age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons 
unless: that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’.  
Article 1 provides that the purpose of the Directive is to combat discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation with 
a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment. National 
implementing legislation incorporated these provisions into national law.  
In the second case, Ms Asma Bougnaoui, a Muslim, was employed as a design engineer by 
Micropole SA. In her interview Micropole made it clear to her that she would not be able to wear 
her veil in all circumstances in the interests of the business and for its development.  
At the request of a client, Micropole requested that Mrs Bougnaoui refrain from wearing her 
headscarf when she was in contact with customers of the business. Micropole cited the principle 
of necessary neutrality, which they required to be applied as regards their clients. Mrs Bougnaoui 
refused to comply with this request and Micropole terminated her contract of employment.  
The national court of first instance and the appeal court found that the dismissal was lawful. On 
the claimant’s appeal to the Court of Cassation, the court referred the following question to the 
CJEU:  
‘Must article 4(1) of [Directive 2000/78] be interpreted as meaning that the wish of a customer of 
an information technology consulting company no longer to have the information technology 
services of that company provided by an employee, a design engineer, wearing an Islamic 
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headscarf, is a genuine and determining occupational requirement, by reason of the nature of the 
particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out?’  
Article 4(1) of the Directive reads:  
‘Notwithstanding Article 2(1) and (2), Member States may provide that a difference of treatment 
which is based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 shall not 
constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities 
concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate’.  
The rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
Bougnaoui 
The Court ruled in Bougnaoui that if the claimant’s dismissal was based on indirect discrimination3 
pursuant to Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78 it could be objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim, such as the implementation, by the respondent undertaking, of a policy of neutrality vis-à-vis 
its customers, provided the means of achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. By 
contrast, if the claimant’s dismissal was not based on the existence of an internal rule but upon the 
wishes of a customer that an employee should not wear an Islamic headscarf on their site, such 
interference with the religious freedom rights of an employee amounted to direct discrimination 
and could only be justified if, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities 
concerned or of the context in which they were carried out, such a characteristic constituted a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective was legitimate and 
the requirement was proportionate. It was for the member states to stipulate that a difference of 
treatment which was based on a characteristic related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 
1 of the Directive did not constitute discrimination. That appeared to be the situation in the present 
case, under Article L. 1133-1 of the French Labour Code. It was, however, for the referring court 
to ascertain. The Court emphasized that it had repeatedly held that it was clear from Article 4(1) 
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of Directive 2000/78 that it was not the ground on which the difference of treatment was based but 
a characteristic related to that ground which must constitute a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement and that, in accordance with recital 23 of Directive 2000/78, it was only 
in very limited circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular, to religion may constitute 
a genuine and determining occupational requirement. A characteristic might constitute such a 
requirement only ‘by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of 
the context in which they are carried out’. The concept of a ‘genuine and determining occupational 
requirement’, referred to a requirement that was objectively dictated by the nature of the 
occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they were carried out. It could not, 
however, cover subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the employer to take account 
of the particular wishes of the customer. Consequently, Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78 had to 
be interpreted as meaning that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a 
customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic 
headscarf could not be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the 
meaning of that provision.  
Achbita 
In the Achbita case the Court found that the undertaking’s internal rule prohibiting the wearing of 
visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs covered any manifestation of such 
beliefs without distinction. It treated all workers of the undertaking in the same way by requiring 
them, in a general and undifferentiated way, inter alia, to dress neutrally. It was not evident from 
the material in the file available to the Court that the internal rule at issue in the main proceedings 
was applied differently to the first claimant employee as compared to any other worker. 
Accordingly, the Court ruled that such an internal rule did not introduce a difference of treatment 
that was directly based on religion or belief, for the purposes of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 
2000/78. However, the Court went on to consider that on the facts of the case the referring court 
might conclude that the internal rule at issue did introduce a difference of treatment indirectly 
based on religion or belief, for the purposes of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78, such that the 
apparently neutral obligation it encompassed resulted in persons adhering to a particular religion 
or belief being put at a particular disadvantage. Under Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Directive 2000/78, such 
indirect discrimination was objectively justified if it pursued a legitimate aim and if the means of 
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achieving that aim were appropriate and necessary. The Court held that the desire to display, in 
relations with both public and private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical or 
religious neutrality was a legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b)(i). An employer’s 
wish to project an image of neutrality towards customers related to the freedom to conduct a 
business pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter and was, in principle, legitimate, notably where the 
employer involved in its pursuit of that aim only those workers who were required to come into 
contact with the employer’s customers. The fact that workers were prohibited from visibly wearing 
signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs was appropriate for the purpose of ensuring 
that a policy of neutrality was properly applied, provided that that policy was genuinely pursued 
in a consistent and systematic manner, which was for the referring court to ascertain.  
As regards the question whether the prohibition was necessary, it was for the referring court to 
ascertain whether, taking into account the inherent constraints to which the undertaking was 
subject, and without G4S being required to take on an additional burden, it would have been 
possible for G4S, faced with such a refusal by the claimant to take off the veil when visiting 
customers on site, to offer her a post not involving any visual contact with those customers, instead 
of dismissing her. It was for the referring court to take into account the interests involved in the 
case and to limit the restrictions on the freedoms concerned to what is strictly necessary. 
Analysis 
The rulings of the CJEU present a number of fundamental problems for the operation of rights 
frameworks within and beyond the borders of the EU. These include first, that they take the 
member states well beyond anything already envisaged in the denial of religious freedom rights at 
a national or international level. This is because in allowing private business the possibility of 
applying a policy of neutrality they take a leap in the incremental approach taken within European 
nation states and within the European Court of Human Rights. According to Daly, laïcité is 
generally understood to be a policy applicable within the public, not the private, sector. It is a 
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‘principle of constitutional secularism [and] is most readily associated with the separation of 
church and state and the religious neutrality of the state’.4  
Second, that if it is deemed wrong and consequently unlawful to discriminate against one 
individual on the grounds of their religion, it must surely be equally if not more wrong and 
consequently unlawful to discriminate against everybody on grounds of their religion or belief. 
While the Bougnaoui case forbids singling out one individual for wearing a hijab, the Achbita case 
legalizes mass discrimination. The fact that the manner in which legislation is formulated allows 
the court to structure its reasoning so as to find discrimination against a single individual 
unacceptable whereas mass discrimination is not, does not alter the illogicality of the comparative 
outcome of both cases. This is unless one takes a strictly positivist approach to law adjudication 
untampered by rules of judicial interpretation permitting a teleological approach leading to a more 
holistic reasoning5.  
Third, the CJEU judgments must be applied uniformly throughout the union in order to create the 
conditions that facilitate factor mobility and integration. The effect of the uniform application of 
the judgment is that a business can force compliance with its policy of neutrality in a country which 
does not necessarily have a laic form of government or constitutional settlement between citizens 
and the state. This then creates a form of laïcité by the back door, ultimately allowing business to 
dictate the conditions of constitutional settlement to government. In the Achbita and Bougnaoui 
cases the member state governments making representations did not themselves support the 
ultimate ruling given by the court. No doubt precisely because it would allow business to create 
an employment ethos which even in laic states was reserved for the public, not private, 
employment. The CJEU judgments involve the Court in an indirect interference with affairs close 
to member state sovereignty and outside the purview of the European Union (at least until it is 
agreed in Treaty form between member states). A consequence of this is that the judgments provide 
 
 
4 The increased blurring of the distinction between the application of laïcité in the public and private spheres is 
discussed by Daly, E. ‘Laïcité in the Private Sphere? French Religious Liberty After the Baby-Loup Affair’ (2016) 
OJLR 5(2): 211. 
5 For an analysis of the impracticalities of a policy of neutrality see Vanoni, L. P. and Ragone G. (2018) ‘From 
secularisation theory to the pluralistic approach: reconciling religious traditions and modernity in Italian case-law’ in 
Giles, J., Pin A. and Ravitch, F. Law, Religion and Tradition. Springer. Forthcoming 2018.  For an exploration of 
the impact of the failure of the Court to balance the employee religious freedom rights against the employers rights 
to conduct a business see: Adams Z. and Adenitire J O. ‘Ideological Neutrality in the Workplace.’ (2018) 81(2) 
MLR 348-360. 
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a strong rationale for a clean break BREXIT. This is because any form of union, such as a European 
Economic Area, involves acceptance of the acquis communautaire, including the Achbita and 
Bougnaoui jurisprudence. This would open the door for multinational businesses to insist on the 
enforcement of neutrality policies in states within an EEA. An addition problem is that, if, by way 
of a thought experiment, one considers the ultimate effect of this – in 10-20 years time it might be 
that religious symbols were banned in all forms of employment. The question then arises - what 
other forms of religious expression might be incorporated into a policy of neutrality? What about 
the exercise of behavior based on religious precepts that in unspoken and spoken ways govern 
relationships between individuals and groups? Will forgiveness as a relational tool eventually be 
excluded?6  
Fourth, the understanding of religion is flawed. The judgments treat religion as something that can 
be left at the door by an individual when they arrive at work. Weiler discusses this in his recent 
article, arguing that this is to misunderstand the nature of obligations mandated by religion7.  Not 
only this, but it creates a disconnection between a long held theological and philosophical 
understanding of religion as a foundational right, essential to human dignity and human 
flourishing.  
Fifth, linked to this is the idea that religious freedom is a lesser type of protected characteristic 
than other protected characteristic and worthy of weaker protection. Consequently, it then weighs 
less heavily when balanced against other rights, in this case the right to conduct a business.  
Sixth, and again linked to the above, is the idea that religious freedom as a fundamental right can 
be balanced against the right to conduct a business, as a fundamental right. The rights frameworks 
established post World War II were created to protect civil and political rights within a framework 
designed to balance competing fundamental rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union expanded the list of rights capable of protection8. This expansion of rights in and 
of itself is problematic since it establishes a moral basis for rights protection in economic interests 
rather than in human dignity. This problem is exacerbated if the balance built into the Charter is 
 
 
6 The potentially negative effects of rights frameworks being the extent of our moral and relational frameworks is 
discussed by Hauerwas, S. ‘What’s Wrong with Rights. Christian Perspectives Pro and Con’. A presentation at 
Emory University School of Law. 31 March 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9Sz0TOZEAI   
7 Op cit. FN 2.  
8 Charter rights piggy back on to existing EU rights such as, the rights to free movement of goods, services, persons 
or capital.  
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not properly carried out. This failure to balance other rights occurred in the Achbita and Bougnaoui 
cases. In those cases, the court balanced religious freedom and the right to conduct a business. But 
the Charter also includes Article 15 (freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work), 
Article 22 (the union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity) and, Article 31 (fair 
and just working conditions – the right to working conditions which respect an individuals’ health, 
safety and dignity). Had the Court properly considered the spectrum of rights protection built into 
the Charter it is unlikely that it would have come to the conclusion that it did. This takes the 
European Union into a realm where the Court has given a judgment which appears to be clearly 
contrary to the foundational Treaties upon which the Union is built. In particular because it is 
supposed to take a teleological approach to adjudication and account of rights protection in 
member states legal traditions which it did not do.  
A seventh issue with the case is that the assessment of direct and indirect discrimination does not 
take into account the difference between religious and non- religious beliefs, nor does it take into 
account the significance of religious symbols and clothing within different religions. This leads 
the court to class all systems of religious, political or other belief as the same. It disregards 
European Court of Human Rights and national jurisprudence which protects the expression of non-
religious beliefs, including philosophical and political beliefs pursuant to the right to freedom of 
expression, not freedom of religion. This is because the expression of political opinions and the 
manifestation of religion are considered to be worthy of a different type of rights protection. As 
protected characteristics within anti-discrimination legislation freedom of religion is protected 
whereas freedom of expression is not. Freedom of religion enjoys double protection under rights 
frameworks and as a protected characteristic. A blanket policy naming political and philosophical 
beliefs along with the manifestation of religious beliefs will consequently be discriminatory 
against religious individuals.  
Eighth, the denial of religious freedom in public life within the European Union has implications 
for what can only be described as a potentially incoherent EU external policy. Annicchino and 
Ventura identify the problem that ‘Europe lacks the credibility and authority to denounce and 
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counter violations in other parts of the world’ where its own internal policy is to prohibit the 
manifestation of religion in public life9. 
Ninth, the driving out of religion from public life could be said, in part, to be a reaction against 
forms of extremism and terrorism. The fear that the Muslim community includes amongst its 
numbers those who would harm society may be a real one. However, this is not the case for the 
majority of Muslim’s living in Europe who suffer equally if not to a greater extent as a result of 
the stigma consequently attaching to them as a result of the pervasive effects of terrorism. The 
refusal to allow the public manifestation of religion will not only not do anything to assist in 
solving this problem, it could also hinder the ability of society to counter it. This is because if 
religion is discouraged in public life it is more difficult for members of the public to understand 
what different religions stand for, and to discern for themselves truth from falsehood. Ignorance 
and discomfort about public expressions of faith is a real danger not only because it legitimises 
intolerance but because it creates conditions in which individuals can more easily become 
radicalised. Under such conditions there is no way for those who might be influenced by radical 
propaganda to learn about, discern between and see in action, peaceful forms of religion compared 
to violent expressions and manifestations of it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Having identified some of the issues that arise consequent upon the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases, 
and in the light of the uniform approach to the application of EU law, it is clear that concerns I 
raised after the Advocate General’s opinions were given and subsequently expressed by Weiler 
and others over this judgment are well founded. The fact that it could force new constitutional 
settlements vis-à-vis religion on member states is, alone, likely to cause a fragmentation within the 
EU. This, in turn, is likely to impact on EU external relations. The case highlighted a microcosm 
of what is now the very different attitudes and approaches to religion in public life throughout 
Europe. To seek to harmonise these approaches threatens the core of national sovereignty and that 
which is closest to citizens sense of dignity and worth – namely the right to practice or manifest 
 
 
9 Annicchino, P. ‘Coherence (and Consistency) or Organised Hyposcrisy? Religious Freedom in the Law of the 
European Union’, in Foblets, M., Alidadi, K., Nielsen, J. S. and Yanasmayan Z., (eds) (2014) Belief, Law and Politics, 
What Future for a Secular Europe? Ashgate. Farnham, 257-268.  
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their religion or thought system. While it is now common place to credit economic interdependence 
as the tool for keeping the peace in Europe, the delicate balance within nation states constitutional 
settlements vis-à-vis religion is something that Europe interferes with at its peril. Constitutional 
imbalance within nation states may undermine the strong ties upon which Europe relies to maintain 
peaceful relations. It is hoped that in light of the damaging ramifications of this judgment the Court 
will take a step back when it next has the opportunity and right the wrongs it appears to have 
facilitated in this case.  
 
